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Chapter 7
Collusion in multidimensional
auctions
7.1 Introduction
Public procurement outlays constitute a large fraction of GDP inWestern countries.
Dimitri, Piga and Spagnolo (2006) report that the value of public procurement in
EU countries is about 16% of GDP and 20% in the United States. Given the massive
amounts of public money involved in procurement it is important that these funds
are spend efficiently. Unfortunately, collusion seems to be a significant problem
in public procurement.1 Collusion tends to inflate prices and may yield inefficient
allocations. Understanding how collusion in procurement takes place and how
governments can respond to it is therefore an important research goal.
Since public procurement is typically conducted bymeans of auctions, the study
of collusion in procurement can learnmuch from the theory of collusion in auctions.
As seen in chapter 6, the models in this literature focus on auctions in which the
auctioneer only cares about the price of the good. In procurement, the government
also cares about the quality of the good. This implies that the government often
faces a trade-off when awarding the contract to a firm. Should the low quality,
low price firm win the procurement auction, or should the government select the
high quality, high price firm? In practice, contracts are typically awarded to either
the firm that submits the lowest price or the firm that submits the economically
1Albano, Buccirossi, Spagnolo and Zanza (2006) provide several examples of recent cases of collusion
in public procurement.
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most advantageous offer.2 In the former case, the selected firm should meet certain
quality criteria. In the latter case, the government adadopts a scoring rule, that
weighs the price and quality of the offer to order the firms’ proposals.
This chapter extends the results ofMcAfee andMcMillan (1992) to a two-dimen-
sional setting. The analysis builds on Che’s (1993) framework of two-dimensional
auctions. In Che (1993), a buyer has quasilinear preferences over the price and
the quality of the good she buys. Firms have a convex cost of producing quality
and are privately informed about their relative efficiency of producing quality. The
findings of McAfee and McMillan straightforwardly carry over. This exercise helps
to understand one of the key results in the theory of collusion in auctions. In this
sense, the analysis below can be seen as a technical appendix to chapter 6.
That interpretationwould, however, under-appreciate the added value of a two-
dimensional focus over McAfee and McMillan’s one-dimensional focus. In par-
ticular, the literature on collusion in one-dimensional auctions suggests that the
government can use an aggressive reserve price policy.3 This policy is subopti-
mal in a two-dimensional setting. When the government commits to a low reserve
price, firms can still collude and set quality inefficiently. This chapter proposes
an alternative auction format, the reservation utility auction. In this auction, the
government requires firms to offer at least the reservation utility. A reservation uti-
lity policy places a restriction on the admissible price quality combinations and is
therefore the natural extension of a reserve price policy to a two-dimensional auc-
tion format. This reservation utility auction yields the government a strictly higher
payoff than an auction with just a reserve price. The reason is that a reservation uti-
lity auction allows firms to choose their quality level in an ex post efficient manner.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. The model is presented in section
7.2. The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized in section 7.3. Section 7.4
shows how the optimal collusive mechanisms follow from standard mechanism
design. To study collusion, the analysis follows McAfee and McMillan (1992) by
assuming that firms design and commit to a collusive mechanism before they learn
their types. Anti-collusive strategies are studied in section 7.5. Concluding remarks
are in section 7.6.
2 For a good overview of actual procurement practices, see Carpineti, Piga and Zanza (2006).
3An agressive reserve price increases the government’s payoff and simultaneously may help to de-
ter collusion. McAfee and McMillan (1992) first demonstrated the efficacy of a reserve price in a one-
dimensional auction in the presence of a cartel. See Thomas (2005) for an extensive numerical exposition
of this result. Kovacic et al. (2006) recommend practitioners to use a low reserve price policy to deter
collusion.
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7.2 The model
7.2.1 Overview
The set-up closely follows Che (1993). There are two types of players: the govern-
ment and n ≥ 2 firms. The government wishes to obtain an indivisible unit of a
good or service. The government is unable to produce this good itself, so it has to
buy the good from a firm. An alternative assumption with the same implication
might be that the cost of producing for the government is higher than the cost for
the least efficient firm. The government employs a sealed bid auction mechanism.
This means that all firms simultaneously submit their offer, consisting of a price p
and a quality level q. The government selects the firm that submits the best offer at
the auction.
7.2.2 Government
When the government obtains the good from firm i, it receives a utility level
U(pi, qi) = V(qi)− pi, (7.1)
where qi is the quality supplied by firm i and pi is the price paid from the govern-
ment to firm i. The function V(·) evaluates the quality of the good and satisfies
V′(·) > 0, V′′(·) ≤ 0, limq→0 V′(·) = ∞, and limq→∞ V′(·) = 0. After the auction,
it observes the price and quality offers of all firms and awards the contract to the
firm offering the highest utility, given that it is non-negative.
7.2.3 Firms
When firm i is selected by the government to supply the good or service, its profit
is
pii(pi, qi) = pi − c(qi, θi), (7.2)
where c(qi, θi) is the firm’s cost of supplying the good with quality level qi. The cost
function is increasing in the firm-specific cost parameter θi. Each firm is privately
informed about its own cost parameter. The government and the n− 1 other firms
perceive θi as being drawn from a continuous distribution function F(θ) : [θ, θ] →
[0, 1]. Suppressing the firm subscript and arguments, it is assumed that cq > 0, cθ >
0, cqq ≥ 0, cθθ ≥ 0, and cqθ > 0 holds for every firm. Furthermore, the social surplus
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resulting from a sale between the least efficient firm and the government is at most
zero. Technically, maxq{V(q)− c(q, θ)} = 0. This condition is just a normalization.
The government is exactly indifferent between provision of the good by the least
efficient firm and its best outside option (which could be foregoing the product or
producing it in-house).
Before firms learn the realization of their cost parameter, they may form a cartel
by committing to a collusive mechanism. Since firms are assumed to be endowed
with commitment power, firms are unable to cheat on the cartel agreement once
they have committed themselves to it. Using the terminology introduced by McA-
fee andMcMillan (1992), the analysis below considers bothweak and strong cartels.
A weak cartel is unable to make transfers between firms whereas a strong cartel is.
All firms need to commit to the mechanism. If one or more firms reject it, firms act
non-cooperatively at the procurement auction.
7.2.4 Timing
The timing of moves is as follows. First, the firmsmay commit to a collusivemecha-
nism. It is without loss of generality to assume that the firms commit to a mecha-
nism, because bidding non-cooperatively is a mechanism as well. Then, each firm
privately learns its cost parameter and reveals its private information to the mecha-
nism. The mechanism subsequently recommends a particular action to every firm
and every firm adheres to this recommended action. Finally, the government sim-
ply awards the contract to the firm offering the best offer. Quality is assumed to be
contractible, so the government knows the realization of quality at the contracting
stage.
7.3 The non-cooperative equilibrium
This section derives the non-cooperative equilibrium bid strategies. Given the ex
ante symmetry of firms, it is natural to focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which
all firms use the same bid functions {p(θi), q(θi)} to determine their optimal price
and quality offer as a function of the privately known cost parameter. This situation
was first studied by Che (1993) and all results in this section can be found there.
As a first step in finding the equilibrium, lemma 7.1 states that one can restrict
attention to deterministic quality offers. An intuition behind this separability con-
dition is that firms first choose quality such that the size of the pie (the sum of
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firm profit and government utility) is maximized, and then select a price to offer a
division of the pie.
Lemma 7.1 (Che, 1993). In any non-cooperative equilibrium, each firm i offers a quality
level q∗(θi), where
q∗(θi) = argmaxq {V(q)− c(q, θi)} .
Proof. Consider a firm deciding between two offers with the same probability of
winning. These offers, (q, p) and (q∗(θi), p′), are such that V(q∗(θi))− p′ = V(q)−
p. Clearly, both offers imply the same probability of winning, because the govern-
ment is indifferent between them. The profit of the firm, conditional on winning
with an offer (q∗(θi), p′), is
pi(p′, q∗(θi)) = p′ − c(q∗(θi), θi)
= V(q∗(θi))−V(q) + p− c(q∗(θi), θi)
= V(q∗(θi))− c(q∗(θi), θi)−V(q) + c(q, θi) + p− c(q, θi)
≥ p− c(q, θi),
where the inequality follows because q∗(θi) maximizes V(q, θi)− c(q, θi).
Lemma 7.1 greatly simplifies the analysis. Instead of solving a two-dimensional
problem, one now only needs to consider the one-dimensional problem of characte-
rizing the price function p(θi). Assuming that V(q)− p(θi) is decreasing in the cost
parameter θi, the equilibrium probability that a firm wins the procurement auction
is monotonically decreasing in θi. Below, this assumption is shown to hold. So,
the expected profit of a firm i that has a cost parameter θi, but charges a price as if
θi = x, is
E[pii] = Pr
(
x < min
{
θj
}n
j 6=i
)
(p(x)− c(q∗(x), θi))
= H(x)(p(x)− c(q∗(x), θi)), (7.3)
where H(x) ≡ (1− F(x))n−1 denotes the probability that a firm with cost parame-
ter x wins the procurement auction. If p(θ) is part of a symmetric non-cooperative
equilibrium, firm i maximizes (7.3) by setting x = θi. Using standard techniques
from the auction theory literature, consult e.g. Krishna (2002) for a good overview,
one can solve for the equilibrium price function. The next proposition gives the
optimal price and quality offered by each firm in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
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Proposition 7.1 (Che, 1993). In the unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies,
each firm i with cost parameter θi offers
p(θi) = c(q∗(θi), θi) +
∫ θ
θi
H(t)
H(θi)
cθ(q∗(t), t)dt,
q(θi) = q∗(θi).
Proof. A firm with cost parameter θi maximizes (7.3) with respect to x. The first-
order condition, evaluated at x = θi, is
∂
∂θi
(H(θi)p(θi))− ∂∂θi (H(θi)c(q
∗(θi), θi)) + H(θi)cθ(q∗(θi), θi) = 0.
Integrating over the interval [θi, θ] and noting that H(θ) = 0 gives the solution for
p(θi). Observe that the probability of winning is indeed decreasing in θi because
∂
∂θi
(V(q∗(θi))− p(θi)) = Vqqθ − cqqθ − cθ + cθ
+
h(θi)
H(θi)2
∫ θ
θi
H(t)cθ(q(t), t)dt
=
h(θi)
H(θi)2
∫ θ
θi
H(t)cθ(q(t), t)dt < 0,
where the inequality follows because Vq = cq from lemma 7.1, h(θi) < 0 by defini-
tion, and cθ > 0 by assumption.
In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the expected profit of a firm i with cost
parameter θi is
∫ θ
θi
H(t)cθ(q∗(θi), θi)dt. Before the firm learns its cost parameter, the
ex ante expected profit is
E[piNi ] =
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
x
H(t)cθ(q∗(t), t)dt f (x)dx
=
∫ θ
θ
∫ t
θ
H(t)cθ(q∗(t), t) f (x)dxdt
=
∫ θ
θ
F(t)H(t)cθ(q∗(t), t)dt. (7.4)
where the third equation follows from changing the order of integration. Clearly,
when firms are colluding, they require an ex ante expected profit at least as large as
(7.4).
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7.4 Optimal collusive mechanisms
From now on, assume that firms may form a cartel. Before the firms learn their
cost parameter, they design a collusive mechanism that maximizes joint expected
profits.
7.4.1 Some mechanism design
The problem for the firms of how to collude is not straightforward. First, firms are
privately informed about their own cost parameter and therefore must somehow
select a firm that ultimately wins the procurement auction. A second and closely
related problem is that all losing firms must be compensated. If their expected
collusive profits are lower than the non-cooperative profits the firms will reject the
proposed mechanism. Third, the firms may not be able to make transfers. A firm
that just won the procurement auction and donates large sums of money to losing
firms may raise the suspicion of the authorities.
Stated in the language of mechanism design theory, the first problem means
that the mechanism should be incentive compatible. The second problem implies
that the mechanism should satisfy the individual rationality constraint. If the third
problem is applicable, one needs to impose the restriction that the mechanism does
not stipulate transfers between firms.
The revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) implies that one can focus on incen-
tive compatible direct mechanisms. In a direct mechanism, it is optimal for eve-
ry firm to truthfully reveal its private information to the mechanism. Let θ−i ≡
{θ1, θ2, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn−1, θn}. Then, if n− 1 firms report that their cost para-
meters are θ−i and firm i reports θi = xi, the mechanism selects firm i to be the
designated winner with probability ai(xi, θ−i). The winning firm is required to de-
liver the good with quality qi(x, θ−i). Conditional on all reports, firm i receives an
expected transfer of bi(xi, θ−i) from the mechanism. Then,
Lemma 7.2. A mechanism described by {ai(θi, θ−i), bi(θi, θ−i), qi(x, θ−i)} is incentive
compatible if and only if
dE [pii(θi)]
dθi
= −ai(θi, θ−i)cθ(qi(θi), θi)
and
a′i(θi, θ−i) ≤ 0.
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Proof. The proof of this result is standard in the mechanism design literature, but
is included for the sake of completeness. Consider firm i with cost efficiency θi, but
announces to the mechanism that its type is x. Given that all other firms truthfully
submit their information to the mechanism, firm i maximizes its expected profit
E [pii(x, θi)] = bi(x, θ−i)− ai(x, θ−i)c(qi(x), θi)
with respect to x. In an incentive compatible mechanism, it is optimal for the firm
to announce x = θi. Therefore, the necessary condition for the firm’s maximization
problem is
∂pii(x, θi)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=θi
= b′i(θi, θ−i)− a′i(θi, θ−i)c(qi(θi), θi)
− ai(θi, θ−i)cq(qi(θi), θi)q′i(θi) = 0. (7.5)
Given that the mechanism is incentive compatible, the firm optimally chooses x =
θi and the expected profit of firm i can be written as
E [pii(θi)] = bi(θi, θ−i)− ai(θi, θ−i)c(qi(θi), θi).
Totally differentiating the above expression gives
dE [pii(θi)]
dθi
= b′i(θi, θ−i)− a′i(θi, θ−i)c(qi(θi), θi)
− ai(θi, θ−i)(cθ(qi(θi), θi) + cq(qi(θi), θi)q′i(θi)). (7.6)
Subtracting (7.5) from (7.6) gives the necessary condition
dE [pii(θi)]
dθi
= −ai(θi, θ−i)cθ(qi(θi), θi).
Now, in order to obtain the sufficient condition for incentive compatibility, observe
that the sufficient condition for the firm’s maximization problem is, evaluated in
x = θi,
b′′i (θi, θ−i)− a′′i (θi, θ−i)c(qi(θi), θi)− 2a′i(θi, θ−i)cq(qi(θi), θi)q′i(θi)
− ai(θi, θ−i) ∂∂x (cq(qi(θi), θi)q
′
i(θi)) ≤ 0. (7.7)
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Differentiating the necessary condition for profit maximization (7.5) with respect to
θi gives
b′′i (θi, θ−i)− a′′i (θi, θ−i)c(qi(θi), θi)− 2a′i(θi, θ−i)cq(qi(θi), θi)q′i(θi)
− ai(θi, θ−i) ∂∂x (cq(qi(θi), θi)q
′
i(θi))− a′i(θi, θ−i)cθ(qi(θi), θi) = 0. (7.8)
Relying once again on the same trick as before allows one to obtain a convenient
sufficient condition for incentive compatibility. Subtracting equation (7.8) from (7.7)
shows that the sufficient condition can be written as
a′i(θi, θ−i)cθ(qi(θi), θi) ≤ 0.
However, by assumption, cθi (qi(θi), θi) is strictly positive. So, the sufficient condi-
tion for incentive compatibility reduces to
a′i(θi, θ−i) ≤ 0.
Hence, incentive compatibility requires that the expected profit of every firm
in the mechanism is decreasing in its cost parameter. Moreover, the mechanism
should be (weakly) efficient. Observe that the non-cooperative outcome can be re-
plicated via an incentive compatible mechanism in which each firm truthfully an-
nounces its cost parameter, and themechanism submits for every a bid {p(θ),q∗(θ)}
to the procurement official. However, the interesting question is whether the firms
can construct an alternative mechanism that attains profits above the non-coopera-
tive level. McAfee andMcMillan (1992) show that the optimal collusive mechanism
depends on the ability of firms to make side transfers. Weak cartels may be unable
to attain profits above the non-cooperative level. In a strong cartel, i.e. when cartel
members are allowed to make transfers, firms are able to obtain the full surplus.
The next two sections extends these results to two-dimensional auctions.
7.4.2 Weak cartels
By definition, members of a weak cartel cannot make explicit monetary transfers to
each other.4 This implies that bi(θ) = 0 for all θ. As a result, the only instruments
4 Implicit transfers may be possible if the government regularly conducts procurement auctions. In
that case, the cartel members may e.g. temporarily exclude a previous winner from future auctions.
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left to the designer of the mechanism are the allocation functions ai(θ) and quality
function qi(θ).
Absent asymmetric information, cartel profits would be maximized if the col-
lusive mechanism is efficient. This requires a′i < 0. Then, the firm with the most
advanced technology is selected to be the winner of the auction and this firm ful-
ly extracts the social surplus by supplying a quality q∗. If a weak cartel uses an
efficient mechanism, the ex ante expected profit of firm i is
E[pii] =
∫ θ
θ
pii(t) f (t)dt
= pii(t)F(t)
∣∣θ
θ
−
∫ θ
θ
d
dt
pii(t)F(t)dt.
The second equation follows from integration by parts. Clearly, in the above ex-
pression pi(θ) = 0 and F(θ) = 0. From lemma 7.2, any incentive compatible me-
chanism satisfies dE[pii ]dθi = −aicθ , where the arguments are omitted. Furthermore,
efficiency implies that ai(θi) = H(θi). Using these observations expected profits
can be rewritten as
E[pii] =
∫ θ
θ
F(t)H(t)cθ(q∗(t), t)dt. (7.9)
But this equals the non-cooperative profit level, as given by equation (7.4). As a
result,
Lemma 7.3. In any efficient weak collusive mechanism, firms attain non-cooperative pro-
fits.
This ‘impossibility theorem’ mirrors a related finding by McAfee and McMillan
(1992). They show that, in the context of one-shot first-price auctions, the dual con-
dition of efficiency and zero profits for cartel members with a valuation below the
reserve price implies that the cartel cannot improve on the non-cooperative outco-
me. The intuition for this result is straightforward. The celebrated Revenue Equi-
valence Principle (REP) from auction theory states that if values are independently
and identically distributed and bidders are risk neutral,
“[. . . ] any symmetric and increasing equilibrium of any standard aucti-
on, such that the expected payment of a bidder with value zero is zero,
yields the same expected revenue to the seller.” (Krishna, 2002).
This increases the expected profit of all other firms and therefore constitutes a dynamic transfer. See for
instance Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) for a model along these lines.
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The procurement auction in this chapter can be interpreted, after some changes
of variables, as a standard first-price auction and is therefore subject to the logic
of the REP as well. Given that the firms are risk neutral, and their cost parame-
ters are identically and independently distributed, any efficient mechanism imp-
lies that each firm earns its informational rent, plus some constant. Because the
least efficient firm does not have an informational rent, and necessarily earns ze-
ro profits, the REP implies that the cartel’s profits under the mechanism equal the
non-cooperative profits.
Hence, a weak cartel cannot expect to extract the full social surplus. In so-
me cases, however, a weak cartel might be able to attain supra-non-cooperative
profits. By lemma 7.3 this requires the firms to sacrifice efficiency. An example
of an inefficient mechanism is bid rotation, which is a collusive agreement under
which the cartel members agree to be randomly allocated to be the designated win-
ner of the procurement auction, may improve on the non-cooperative outcome if
the technological environment satisfies certain properties. More specifically, let
K(x) ≡ F(x)f (x) cθ(q(x), x). Then,
Proposition 7.2. In a weak cartel, the expected weak collusive profits E[piWC] are maxi-
mized by non-cooperative bidding if K′(x) ≤ 0. Bid rotation is optimal if K′(x) ≥ 0.
Proof. The ex ante expected profit of firm i is
E[piWCi ] =
∫ θ
θ
pii(t) f (t)dt
= pii(t)F(t)
∣∣θ
θ
−
∫ θ
θ
dpii(t)
dt
F(t)dt
= pi(θ)F(θ)− pi(θ)F(θ)−
∫ θ
θ
dpii(t)
dt
F(t)dt
=
∫ θ
θ
ai(t, θ−i)cθ(qi(t), t)F(t)dt.
Use integration by parts to go to the second equation, and insert the necessary
condition for incentive compatibility to arrive at the third line. Industry profits can
now be written as
E
[
n
∑
i=1
piWCi
]
= E
[
n
∑
i=1
F(t)
f (t)
ai(t, θ−i)cθ(qi(t), t)
]
.
If K(·) is monotonically decreasing, the industry profits are maximized by giving
the largest weight to the most efficient firm. This is achieved by choosing a′i < 0.
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From lemma 7.3, this implies non-cooperative profits.
Now, suppose that K(·) is monotonically increasing. To save on notation, let
µi(x) denote E−i[ai(x, θ−i)], which is firm i’s expectation that it will be the designa-
ted winner, conditional on its announcement x to the mechanism. By deriving an
upper bound on the industry profits, one can show that the cartel can achieve this
upper bound by using a bid rotation device. The industry’s profits are
E
[
n
∑
i=1
piWCi
]
=
n
∑
i=1
∫ θ
θ
F(t)
f (t)
cθ(qi(t), t)µi(t) f (t)dt
≤
n
∑
i=1
(∫ θ
θ
F(t)
f (t)
cθ(qi(t), t) f (t)dt ·
∫ θ
θ
µi(t) f (t)dt
)
=
n
∑
i=1
∫ θ
θ
µi(t) f (t)dt ·
∫ θ
θ
F(t)
f (t)
cθ(qi(t), t) f (t)dt
≤
∫ θ
θ
F(t)cθ(qi(t), t)dt.
The first inequality follows from a generalization of Chebyshev’s inequality. The
interested reader is referred to Sun (1996) for details. The second inequality stems
from the fact that E[∑ ai(x, θ−i)] ≤ 1. The cartel can easily obtain this bound on
profits. Under a bid rotation arrangement, every firm is the designated winner
with probability 1/n. This implies that the cost parameter of the winner is drawn
from the cdf F(θ). At the procurement auction, it is in the designated winner’s
interest to maximize its profits p− c(q, θi) with respect to price and quality, subject
to the constraint V(q)− p ≥ 0. Clearly, it is optimal for the firm to supply q∗(θi)
and charge p = V(q∗(θi)). The industry profit therefore equals
E
[
n
∑
i=1
pii
]
=
∫ θ
θ
(V(q∗(t)− c(q∗(t), t)) f (t)) dt
=
∫ θ
θ
F(t)
(
d
dt
c(q∗(t), t)− d
dt
V(q∗(t))
)
dt.
From the necessary condition for profit maximization, one knows that ∂∂qV(q
∗) =
∂
∂q c(q
∗, θ). This allows one to rewrite total profits as
E
[
n
∑
i=1
piWCi
]
=
∫ θ
θ
F(t)cθ(q∗(t), t)dt.
Thus, bid rotation achieves the upper bound.
As one can see, the above proof closely follows McAfee and McMillan’s (1992)
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proof of their theorem 1. The proof for the two-dimensional case is stated here
because it remains to show that quality is chosen optimally. Furthermore, a crucial
step requires a generalization of Chebychev’s inequality, a detail that McAfee and
McMillan did not mention in their proof.
Again, there is an interesting parallel with the work of McAfee and McMillan
(1992). In a standard auctions context, they show that if 1−F(x)f (x) is increasing, it
is optimal for a weak cartel to bid in a non-cooperative fashion. If, on the other
hand, 1−F(x)f (x) is decreasing, bid rotation is optimal. Their finding is extended to
procurement auctions. In a two-dimensional auction, bid-rotation is optimal if F(x)f (x)
increases sufficiently fast. For example, if V(q) = √q and c(q, θ) = qθ, then bid
rotation is optimal if the θ’s are distributed according to the uniform distribution.
On the other hand, non-cooperative play is optimal when the cost parameters are
random draws from the Pareto distribution. Complementing McAfee and McMil-
lan (1992), the above analysis shows that not only the mere distribution of types is
relevant for the choice of the optimal collusive mechanism, but also the shape of the
cost function. In particular, bid rotation is optimal if the cost function is sufficiently
convex.
7.4.3 Strong cartels
There are many examples of bidding rings which were able to compensate losing
firms. McAfee and McMillan (1992) establish that a strong cartel can extract the
full ex post social surplus by organizing a preauction knockout (PAKT). This is an
auction before the actual auction, where the firms bid for the right to be the only
contender. The revenue from this auction is split evenly between the cartel mem-
bers. This result carries over to the two-dimensional procurement auction.
From an ex post perspective, the spoils from collusion are maximized by awar-
ding the right to be the single bidder to the most efficient firm. This firm supplies a
socially optimal (and hence efficient) level of quality and charges p = V(q∗(θ)). If
such a mechanism exists, the ex ante expected cartel profits amount to
E
[
n
∑
i=1
piSCi
]
=
∫ θ
θ
pi(t)nF(t)(1− F(t))n−1dt
=
∫ θ
θ
(V(q∗(t))− c(q∗(t), t)) nF(t)(1− F(t))n−1dt, (7.10)
where nF(t)(1− F(t))n−1 is the probability density function of the first-order statis-
tic. Consider a PAKT where firms non-cooperatively and simultaneously submit a
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sealed bid Ti. The highest bidder i pays every other firm Ti and all other firms com-
mit to stay away from the actual procurement auction (or to submit phony bids). It
is straightforward to show the following.
Proposition 7.3. The symmetric equilibrium bid function at the PAKT is
T(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
(1− F(t))n−1
(1− F(θ))n (V(q
∗(t), t)− c(q∗(t), t)) f (t)dt.
The winning firm submits an uncontested bid at the procurement auction that extracts the
full social surplus and pays every losing bidder T(θ). This mechanism is efficient, achieves
budget balance, and maximizes cartel profits.
Proof. To derive the equilibrium bid function, suppose that in the PAKT, n− 1 firms
truthfully submit their bid using T(θ) and T′(θ) < 0. Firm i submits a bid as if its
cost parameter is x. Then, the expected profit of firm i is
H(x)(V(q∗(θ))− c(q∗(θ), θi)− (n− 1)T(x))−
∫ x
θ
T(y)h(y)dy.
The first-order condition, evaluated in x = θi, implies that
h(θ)
H(θ)
T′(θi) +
n
n− 1T(θ) =
V(q∗(θ))− c(q∗(θ), θi)
n− 1 .
This is a linear first-order differential equation with variable coefficients. Using
e
(∫ θ
θ
n
n−1
h(t)
H(t) dt
)
as the integrating factor and noting that T(θ) = 0, the solution can
be shown to be
T(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
(1− F(t))n−1
(1− F(θ))n (V(q
∗(t), t)− c(q∗(t), t)) f (t)dt.
To prove the other claims in the proposition, note that T′(θ) < 0. Hence, effi-
cient firms submit higher bids than inefficient firms and therefore the most efficient
firm in the cartel is the designated winner of the procurement auction. Budget
balance is trivially achieved because the scheme divides the full social surplus bet-
ween all cartel members. Cartel profits are maximized as the most efficient firm
is selected, this firm extracts the full social surplus, and transfers a fraction of this
surplus to every other cartel member.
The PAKT allows firms to obtain the maximum possible profits, as given by
equation (7.10), because it is efficient and the government receives zero utility. As
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mentioned above, McAfee and McMillan (1992) find a similar result for a one-
dimensional first-price auction. The fact that a PAKT also enables firms to maxi-
mize profits for a two-dimensional procurement auction, suggests that a PAKT is
an optimal collusive mechanism for more general environments.
Given that a PAKT is optimal in quite general environments, it should not come
as a surprise that many real-world cartels have relied on agreements that are simi-
lar to a PAKT. Even without knowledge of the rather intricate details of mechanism
design, many cartels have figured out how to optimally collude. For example, the
cast-iron-pipe cartel (1894–1898), which is the first cartel convicted under the Sher-
manAct5, used amechanism similar to a PAKT, see Orr andMacAvoy (1965). There
are strong indications that the Dutch construction cartel operated under a PAKT as
well. The interested reader is referred to the report of the parliamentary inquiry
commission for an extensive description of this cartel (The Vos Committee, 2002).
7.5 Coping with collusion
The collusive mechanisms studied in this chapter have important implications for
the government. Both a weak cartel and a strong cartel leave the government with
zero utility. A weak cartel has the additional drawback that it is inefficient. Sin-
ce government projects are typically financed by means of distortionary taxation,
decreasing the impact of collusion should be a top priority.
There are several ways to do this. An emerging strand of literature, initiated by
Motta and Polo (2003), focuses on the use of optimal fines and leniency programs
to destabilize cartels. By punishing cartel members and awarding fine reductions
to firms who self-report, a cartel may break down. A leniency policy is a gene-
ral method to destabilize cartels and is applicable in many other markets besides
auctions.
Another approach, which is more specific to auctions, is suggested by McAfee
and McMillan (1992). They propose that the auctioneer can actively meddle with
the collusive mechanism. If the auctioneer suspects that firms have formed a bid-
ding ring, for instance, he could commit to bargain with a single firm. This instantly
breaks down the cartel (as there is just one firm active) and leaves the auctioneer
with a positive surplus.6 Another way in which the government can interfere with
the collusive mechanism is by being vague about the government’s valuation for
5Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271,(1898).
6 See the following chapter for a comparison of negotiations and auctions in the presence of a cartel.
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quality. That is, the government does not resolve any uncertainty among the firms
about V(q). This might make it harder for the firms to find the optimal collusive
price and creates a need for communication between firms. Given that commu-
nication between firms can be intercepted by the anti-trust authority, this strategy
makes collusion more costly to the firms.
The third approach, and the one pursued below, consists of changing the auc-
tion rules. More specifically, the government may announce (and commit to) a
reservation utility, which means that only bids that yield the government at least
a minimum utility level are eligible. The first-score auction is a special case of the
reservation utility auction, as it requires firms to submit bids that leave the govern-
ment with at least zero utility. Even if firms coordinate their bids, the reservation
utility auction guarantees at least a positive expected utility. The section below
derives the optimal reservation utility auction. This auction maximizes the govern-
ment’s surplus, given the presence of a bidding ring.
7.5.1 The reservation utility auction
Suppose that the government commits to a reservation utility U ≥ 0 and the firms
collude by organizing a PAKT. Then, the cartel’s designated winner clearly chooses
to leave the government with the lowest possible utility, which is U. The profit of
the selected firm is, after substituting for the price, pi = V(q) − c(q, θ) − U. As
U is constant, the selected firm offers the quality level q∗(θ) that maximizes social
surplus, given θ.
If U > 0, some relatively inefficient firms are excluded. In particular, all firms
with type above θˆ are unable to supply the minimum utility level, where θˆ is im-
plicitly (and uniquely) defined by V(q∗(θˆ))− c(q∗(θˆ), θˆ) = U. The problem for the
government is to choose U such that
E[U] = Pr(θ < θˆ)U
= (1− (1− F(θˆ))n)U
= (1− (1− F(θˆ))n)(V(q∗(θˆ))− c(q∗(θˆ), θˆ)) (7.11)
is maximized. To go from the first to the second line, note that the distribution of θ
is the distribution of the lowest-order statistic since the firms use a PAKT. To arrive
at the third equation, substitute U for V(q∗(θˆ))− c(q∗(θˆ), θˆ). So, the government
can indirectly find the optimalU by choosing θˆ optimally. The first-order condition
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is
1− (1− F(θˆ))n
n f (θˆ)(1− F(θˆ))n−1 =
V(q∗(θˆ))− c(q∗(θˆ), θˆ)
cθ(q∗(θˆ), θ)
. (7.12)
Then,
Proposition 7.4. Suppose firms collude by using a PAKT. Then, the optimal reservation
utility U is unique if F(·) is log-concave.
Proof. Clearly, U is unique if θˆ is unique. There is a unique solution of (7.12) if
F(θ) is log-concave. To see this, observe that the right-hand side of (7.12) is positive
for θ (because social surplus is positive for the most efficient type) and is strictly
decreasing in θ (because social surplus strictly decreases as the firm becomes less
efficient). The left-hand side is zero for θ, one for θ and increases monotonically if
F(θ) is log-concave.
Log-concavity implies f (x)2 − F(x) f ′(x) ≥ 0. Many ‘named’ probability distri-
butions satisfy this property, including the uniform, the exponential, and the nor-
mal distribution. See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for an extensive discussion of
log-concavity. Interestingly, log-concavity also implies that the mechanism design
problem is regular.
It is straightforward to show that proposition 7.4 can be extended to the case
where firms collude by using a bid-rotation mechanism. In that case, the efficiency
parameter of the selected firm is drawn from F(θ), conditional on θ < θˆ.
7.5.2 Minimum quality, maximum price
Despite its theoretical appeal, few government agencies seem to use the reservation
utility auction. Presumably, an important obstacle that hinders its actual implemen-
tation is that in reality the way in which quality is valued is asymmetrically (and
often imperfectly) known by the government and very costly to communicate to
the firms. Moreover, it may be very hard to describe U in a contract such that a
court can enforce it.
To circumvent these problems, government agencies typically revert to simpler
procurement auction formats. For instance, a government agency could award the
contract to the firm that offers the highest utility, but require that the price does not
exceed a maximum price P and entails at least a minimum quality level Q. To save
some space, call an auction format with these rules a PQ auction.
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It is easy to see that in the first-score auction, P is set at∞ andQ is zero. Suppose
the government uses a PQ auction with a finite maximum price P and positive
quality level Q. Then, if the firms collude by using a PAKT, the selected firm offers
the good at the maximum price with the lowest possible quality level. This implies
that the PQ auction, in contrast to the reservation utility auction, yields productive
inefficiency: the firm’s quality decision does not maximize social surplus. Just as
under the reservation utility auction, however, some inefficient firms are excluded.
All firms with efficiency parameter θ above θ˜, where θ˜ is implicitly defined by P−
c(Q, θ˜) = 0, are unwilling to provide the good.
To maximize its expected utility under this auction format, the government
chooses P and Q to maximize
E[U] = Pr(θ < θ˜)(V(Q)− P). (7.13)
It is not difficult to demonstrate that an optimal reservation utility auction yields a
higher expected utility level than a PQ auctionwhere P andQ are optimally chosen.
Suppose that both auction formats require the same utility from the firm with type
θ that is selected by the cartel. Then, U = V(q∗(θ)) − c(q∗(θ), θ) = V(Q) − P.
Assuming that θ > θˆ and θ > θ˜, the profit for the designated winner under the
reservation utility auction is
pi(θ) = p− c(q∗(θ), θ)
= V(q∗(θ))− c(q∗(θ), θ)−U
> V(Q)− P,
where the inequality follows from the definition of q∗(θ). Thus, keepingU constant,
the profit of a firm under the reservation utility auction is higher than the profit
under the PQ auction. This implies that θˆ (the shut-down type in the reservation
utility auction), is smaller than θ˜ (the shut-down type in the PQ auction). This
means that the expected utility for the government is necessarily higher under the
reservation utility auction because the probability that a firm is unable to supply is
lower. The next proposition summarizes this finding.
Proposition 7.5. Suppose firms collude by sending a single firm to the procurement aucti-
on. Then, the reservation utility auction yields a higher expected utility to the government
than the PQ auction.
Therefore, the reservation utility auction is superior to the PQ auction in terms
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of the expected utility they garner when firms collude. This results holds bothwhen
the firms use a PAKT and when they use a bid-rotation mechanism.
7.5.3 Deterring collusion
The reservation utility auction helps the government to lower the costs of collusion.
It may even allow the government to deter collusion altogether, as the analysis in
this section shows.
Equation (7.12) characterizes the unique optimal reservation utility U if firms
collude. Call this solution UK. It should be clear that in this case the optimal reser-
vation utility (call it UN) differs from UK. This is because a cartel member offers
a price and quality such that the government just obtains UK. A non-cooperative
firm cannot afford to do this. It is subject to competition from other firms and the-
refore offers a higher utility than UN . As can be shown using standard tricks, a
non-cooperative firm offers a quality level q∗(θ) and charges a price
pˆ(θ) = c(q∗(θ), θ) +
∫ θˆ
θ
H(t)
H(θ)
cθ(q∗(θ), θ)dt. (7.14)
The government’s expected utility under non-cooperative bidding is
E[U] = n
∫ θˆ
θ
[V(q∗(θ))− pˆ(θ)] (1− F(θ))n−1 f (θ)dθ. (7.15)
The optimal reservation utility level under non-cooperative behavior is characteri-
zed by
F(θˆ)
f (θˆ)
=
V(q∗(θˆ), θˆ)− c(q∗(θˆ), θˆ)
cθ(q∗(θˆ), θˆ)
. (7.16)
Again, the optimal θˆ, and therefore the optimal UN , is uniquely defined if F(θ) is
log-concave.
The government’s response, U, is affected by the firms’ decision to cartelize.
The government commits to UN if firms do not collude, and to UK if they collude
by using a PAKT. Clearly, changes in U affect firms’ expected profits. It may even
be possible that the firms’ expected profits under collusion are lower than under
competition, once the government commits to the optimal reservation utility level.
To show this formally, consider the following timing of events. First, firms de-
cide whether they form a bidding ring. If one or more firms decide not to join
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the ring, all firms act non-cooperatively at the procurement auction. Second, the
government observes the cartel decision of the firms (but cannot notify the anti-
trust authorities) and commits to a reservation utility. Third, the cartel members or
the non-cooperative firms submit bids and the contract is awarded according to the
rules of the reservation utility auction.
The assumptions about the timing of events seems to be fairly realistic. In prac-
tice, the government agency designs a procurement process, given the expected
behavior of firms. Firms form a cartel only if the expected benefits outweigh the
expected costs. See Thomas (2005) for a study of optimal reserve prices in the pre-
sence of collusion in first-price one-dimensional auctions that employs the same
assumptions about timing.
It is impossible to compare profits for the general case. Therefore, consider the
following parametric assumptions: V(q) = q, c(q, θ) = θq and θ is drawn from
U(0, 1).
n 100 ∗ E[piN ] 100 ∗ E[piK] n 100 ∗ E[piN ] 100 ∗ E[piK]
1 4.321 4.321 8 0.996 0.988
2 3.395 3.125 9 0.808 0.868
3 2.695 2.400 10 0.717 0.770
4 2.163 1.918 11 0.616 0.688
5 1.754 1.589 12 0.534 0.620
6 1.437 1.328 13 0.476 0.562
7 1.190 1.137 14 0.411 0.513
Table 7.1. Profits under Competition and Collusion
Table 7.1 shows the expected profits per firm, both under non-cooperative and
collusive behavior. For n ≥ 8, firms expect higher profits if they can commit to
non-cooperative behavior. Hence, collusion lowers firms’ profits if their number is
relatively small and the government optimally responds to the presence of a cartel.
Consistent with McAfee and McMillan (1992) and Thomas (2005), these results
suggest that the government has the tools to mitigate the effects of collusion or
to even deter it. However, the optimal tool differs in a two-dimensional setting.
Instead of a reserve price, the government should commit to a reservation utility. In
practice, this could be implemented by using a scoring rule auction, and requiring
that the winning offer attains at least a minimum score. See Dini, Pacini and Valletti
(2006) for a discussion of scoring rules. In practice, scoring rules are used to rank
multidimensional bids. The message of this chapter is that scoring rules can be an
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anti-collusive device.
7.6 Concluding remarks
Ample anecdotal, legal, and empirical evidence shows that firms collude in pu-
blic procurement. To study collusion in procurement, Che’s (1993) model of multi-
dimensional auctions is extended McAfee and McMillan’s (1992) results on collusi-
on. Interestingly, in contrast to the optimal mechanism (from the cartel’s perspecti-
ve), collusion does not distort the quality decision of the firms, but does reduce the
government’s expected utility to zero.
To lower the costs of collusion, or even to deter it, the government can try to
commit to a reservation utility auction. It is shown that this auction format ena-
bles the government to capture a large fraction of the social surplus, even in the
presence of collusion. Using simple arguments, it is demonstrated that the reser-
vation utility auction is a better instrument to mitigate the costs of collusion than
the commonly used (and advocated) auction with a reserve price and a minimum
quality level. Finally, using a parametric example, the anti-collusive effect of the re-
servation utility auction is demonstrated. This suggests that procurement agencies
could profitably procure goods or services by using an auction with a scoring rule,
combined with a minimum score requirement.

Chapter 8
Auctions vs. negotiations with
asymmetric or colluding buyers
8.1 Introduction
When an owner of a valuable asset decides to sell his property he may conduct
an auction to maximize his expected profits, but there are alternative mechanisms.
In practice, a seller (or, in a procurement context, a buyer) often reverts to nego-
tiations with a single buyer.1 The use of negotiations is puzzling, as Bulow and
Klemperer (1996) (BK henceforth) have shown that auctions tend to yield more re-
venue than negotiations. More precisely, they demonstrate that an English auction
without a reserve price and n+ 1 buyers generates more revenue than the optimal
mechanism (assuming the seller has superior bargaining skills) with n buyers. This
suggests that revenue-maximizing sellers should direct attention at expanding the
set of buyers instead of designing ‘clever’ negotiation procedures.
The aim of this chapter is to understand why some sellers still prefer negoti-
ations over auctions. To do so, the analysis of BK is adjusted in three directions.
First, the seller is allowed to have better information than buyers, in the sense that
a seller knows the value of each buyer whereas the buyers only know their own
value and perceive the value of each other buyer as being randomly drawn from
some probability distribution. Then, with a superiorly informed seller, BK’s reve-
1 Examples include public procurement officials or boards of directors involved in the takeover of their
company. See Significant B.V. (2005) for an overview of the practice of public procurement in the Ne-
therlands. They report that procurement agencies are reluctant to comply with European procurement
guidelines, which stipulate that large projects should be publicly tendered. Boone and Mulherin (2007)
study the market for corporate takeovers. They find that about 50% of corporate acquisitions are accom-
plished through auctions and the other half through negotiations.
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nue ranking is shown to be reversed. Second, buyers are often asymmetric. In a
European Union-wide public procurement process, as an example, the costs of a
domestic firm are likely to be drawn from a very different distribution than the
costs of a foreign firm. Third, the buyers are assumed to coordinate their behavior
in a bidding ring. Asymmetry and collusion turn out to have similar effects. BK’s
revenue ranking remains intact if the buyers are not too asymmetric or the cartel is
not too large.
This chapter continues with a quick review of BK’s result in section 8.2.1. BK
assume that the seller is uninformed about the realization of the values of the buy-
ers. In section 8.2.2 the effect of an informed buyer in considered. The “auction vs.
negotiation” result is reconsidered for asymmetric buyers and colluding buyers in
section 8.3 and 8.4, respectively. Section 8.5 offers some final remarks.
8.2 The symmetric benchmark
8.2.1 An uninformed seller
A seller owns an indivisible object and may sell it to one of n ≥ 1 symmetric buy-
ers. The seller’s value for the object is normalized to zero, and the buyers’ values
are drawn independently from a common cumulative distribution function F with
support [0, v].2 Buyers privately observe their value and are uninformed about the
realization of the other values. F is continuously differentiable and has a positive
density on its entire support. Additionally, the virtual valuation φ(u) ≡ u− 1−F(u)f (u)
increases in u. This assumption guarantees that the seller’s mechanism design pro-
blem is regular. In the present context, regularity implies that it is optimal to set a
reserve price and allocate the object to the highest bidder. Each buyer is privately
informed about its value before the auction or mechanism takes place. The seller
and the buyers are risk-neutral and aim to maximize expected payoffs.
From the theory ofmechanism design, it is well-known that the seller can extract
at most
ΠN = E[max{φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, 0}] (8.1)
from the buyers. The subscript N refers to negotiations and φi is the virtual va-
luation of buyer i. See Myerson (1981) for the seminal contribution to mechanism
2 This chapter restricts attention to the private values framework. BK study auctions and negotiations
in a more general interdependent values setting.
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design and Krishna (2002) for a recent introduction. This places an upper bound on
the revenue the seller may expect from negotiations. In fact, the seller is likely to
obtain much less revenue from negotiations. This is because the seller is unlikely to
hold all bargaining power, as mechanism design theory presupposes. Furthermore,
he may not be able to commit to actions that are dominated ex post.
The seller may also allocate the object by means of an absolute English auction.
This is an auction without a reserve price in which the price continuously increases
until all but one bidder have dropped out. By the assumption that buyers are sym-
metric and that virtual valuations are increasing, the revenue of the auction can be
written as
ΠEA = E[max{φ1, φ2, . . . , φn}], (8.2)
where the subscript EA refers to English auction. This is clearly, and by definition,
lower than the revenue from the optimal mechanism. However, BK show that with
just one additional buyer, the revenue of the absolute English auction is strictly
larger than the revenue of negotiating with the former set of buyers.
Proposition 8.1 (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996). An absolute English auction with n+ 1
buyers yields more expected revenue than any negotiation with n buyers.
Proof. The proof follows Krishna (2002). It is obvious that the auction dominates the
optimal mechanism if max{φ1, . . . , φn} > 0. Therefore, suppose that max{φ1, . . . ,
φn}< 0. Then,
E[max{φ1, . . . , φn, φn+1}|max{φ1, . . . , φn} < 0]
> max{E[φ1|φ1 < 0], . . . , E[φn|φn < 0], E[φn+1]}
= max{E[φ1|φ1 < 0], . . . , E[φn|φn < 0], 0}
= 0
= E[max{φ1, . . . , φn, 0}|max{φ1, . . . , φn} < 0].
The inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the fact that “max” is a convex
function.3
Hence, the auction is also superior if max{φ1, . . . , φn} < 0 and the result follows.
3 To see this, note first that a function f (x) = f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is convex if λ f (x) + (1 − λ) f (y) ≥
f (λx+ (1− λ)y) for all x and y in the domain of f and all λ in (0, 1). Suppose without loss of generality
that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . ≥ xn. Then, max{x} is convex if λx1 + (1− λ)max{y} ≥ max{λx+ (1− λ)y}. By
assumption, λx1 + (1− λ)max{y} ≥ max{λx + (1− λ)y} and a sufficient condition for convexity is
therefore λx1 + (1− λ)max{y} ≥ λx1 + (1− λ)max{y}. This weak inequality is exactly met.
130 Chapter 8
The common interpretation of proposition 8.1 is that competition is more va-
luable than negotiations. A revenue-maximizing seller is better off by spending
resources to enlarge the number of buyers, than to find the optimal mechanism.
Krishna’s (2002) proof of proposition 8.1 is used here mainly because of its ele-
gance. However, it may be instructive to discuss an alternative proof. In a re-
cent contribution, Kirkegaard (2006) offers an intuitive interpretation of BK’s re-
sult. Consider the revenue of the optimal mechanism, ΠN , with n buyers. With
n+ 1 buyers, the seller can easily obtain the same revenue by applying the optimal
mechanism to the first n buyers, and give the object for free to the (n + 1)th buy-
er if the object was not allocated under the optimal mechanism. This mechanism
always allocates the object to a buyer. However, the seller can do even better by
conducting an absolute English auction. This is because the absolute English aucti-
on is the optimal mechanism to allocate an object, subject to the condition that the
object must be allocated.
8.2.2 An informed seller
BK assume that the revenue of negotiations is bounded by the expected revenue
of the optimal mechanism. This assumption implicitly supposes that the seller is
equally informed about the value of any given buyer as each other buyer. In ma-
ny important settings, this common prior assumption seems to be justifiable. For
instance, buyers and sellers on the market of collectible items frequently interact,
regularly change positions (a buyer today could be a seller tomorrow), and have
similar sophisticated information about the value of items.
In other settings, however, it may be more realistic to assume that the seller
has better information about the values than the buyers. This might apply to the
housing market or the market for second-hand cars. In these markets, sellers trade
frequently with inexperienced buyers. The large number of trades enables sellers to
predict the values of potential buyers. For instance, the value of a potential buyer of
a car might be correlated with observable characteristics, like the size of the buyer’s
family, the buyer’s current car, or whether the buyer owns a dog. Other potential
buyers are less capable of estimating a buyer’s value because they lack the seller’s
experience.
The simplest way to incorporate the idea that the seller has superior informati-
on, is to suppose that the seller knows the buyers’ values. The buyers still consider
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the value of any given buyer as an independent draw from F. By making a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to the buyer with the highest value, the seller can extract the entire
surplus. The (expected) revenue is simply the (expected) highest value. Call this
mechanism perfect negotiations.
The obvious question is whether BK’s revenue ranking extends to perfect nego-
tiations. The answer is no.
Lemma 8.1. Perfect negotiations with n buyers generate more revenue than an absolute
English auction with n+ 1 buyers.
Proof. Perfect negotiations are superior to auctions for any realization of the values.
Let x be the highest value among n buyers, and y the highest value among n + 1
buyers. The revenue of perfect negotiations is x. First, notice that for y > x the
auction yields a revenue of x. This is because the winner of the auction, which
is the additional buyer, pays the second-highest bid, x. For x > y, the winner is
among the first n buyers and pays less than x. Hence, the revenue of the auction is
bounded by x, and strictly lower with positive probability.
This result turns BK’s revenue ranking around. An informed seller would never
find it optimal to invite an additional buyer and let an English auction determine
the price.
One could conjecture that lemma 8.1 follows from the fact that in an English
auction buyers have a dominant strategy to bid their own value. This implies, as
the proof demonstrates, that the revenue of the auction is bounded by the revenue
of negotiations for any realization of the values. Alternative auction formats may
not have this property. However, a simple application of the Revenue Equivalence
Principle shows that lemma 8.1 extends to a comparison of perfect negotiations and
any standard auction format.4, 5
Proposition 8.2. Perfect negotiations with n buyers generate more revenue than any sym-
metric and increasing equilibrium of any absolute standard auction with n+ 1 buyers.
Proposition 8.2 generalizes lemma 8.1. Given that the seller has perfect informa-
tion, he prefers negotiations with n buyers over a simple auction with n+ 1 buyers.
Under the assumption that the seller is uninformed, BK obtain the exact opposite
4Krishna (2002) defines a standard auction as an auction whose rules dictate that the buyer who bids
the highest amount is awarded the object.
5 In the discussion of their main result, BK anticipate this result. However, they do not derive it formally
and do not discuss its implications.
132 Chapter 8
result. BK derive an upper bound on the value of mechanism design, whereas pro-
position 8.2 provides an upper bound on the value of competition. This helps to
understand not only the limitations of BK’s result, but also institutional characte-
ristics of particular markets. For instance, proposition 8.2 may explain why houses
and second-hand cars are predominantly sold via negotiations, and government
bonds and art via auctions.
Admittedly, proposition 8.2 applies only to environments where buyers have
private values. An open question is how this result can be generalized to buyers
with interdependent values.
8.3 Asymmetric buyers
Introducing an informational asymmetry between the seller and buyers upturns
BK’s result. Ex ante asymmetry may also arise between buyers.6 In many important
settings, such as public procurement or corporate takeovers, asymmetry appears to
play a crucial role. The first firm to enter a procurement process, for instance, is
likely to have a lower cost of providing the good than the second firm. This section
discusses the effects of asymmetry between buyers on BK’s revenue ranking.
To keep the analysis tractable, restrict the number of buyers to two and assu-
me that values of the buyers are drawn from the power function distribution with
support [0, 1]. The value of the first buyer is drawn from xα and the second buyer’s
value is drawn from yβ. The exponent of the distribution functions indicates the
strength of a buyer. Buyer 1 is called strong if α > β and weak otherwise. Suppose
that α ≥ 1. This restriction ensures that the mechanism design problem is regular
As before, the revenue of the optimal mechanism is E[max{φ1, 0}]. This can be
written as
ΠN = Pr
(
x− 1− x
α
αxα−1
> 0
)
E
[
x− 1− x
α
αxα−1
∣∣∣x > 1− xα
αxα−1
]
=
α
α+ 1
E
[
x− 1− x
α
αxα−1
∣∣∣x > ( 1
1+ α
)1/α]
= α(α+ 1)
α+1
α . (8.3)
Suppose the seller has the opportunity to invite another potential buyer and con-
duct an absolute English auction. Let F and G be the cumulative distribution func-
6Clearly, there exists an ex post asymmetry between buyers in the private values model since buyers do
not know each others’ values.
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tions of the values of the first and second buyer. Then, expected revenue can be
written as
ΠEA =
∫ v
0
(1− F(u))ug(u)du+
∫ v
0
(1− G(u))u f (u)du.
For the power function distribution, this simplifies to
ΠEA =
αβ(2+ α+ β)
(1+ β)(1+ α+ β)
. (8.4)
Suppose α = 1. Then, the auction is revenue superior if and only if β > − 32 +
1
2
√
17 ≈ 0.562. Hence, BK’s result holds if the additional buyer is not too weak.
This insight applies more generally. The English auction is revenue superior if and
only if
β(2+ α+ β)
(1+ β)(1+ α+ β)
− (1+ α)−1/α > 0. (8.5)
It is not hard to show the following.
Proposition 8.3. There exists a unique β such that for any finite α, the absolute English
auction with two buyers yields more expected revenue than any negotiation with one buyer.
Proof. For β = 0, a non-serious additional buyer, the optimal mechanism yields
a higher revenue than the auction. As β increases, the expected revenue of the
auction increases monotonically. In the limit, as β becomes arbitrarily large, the
auction dominates negotiations because the price paid by the winner of the auction
is the value of the first buyer. As a result, there is a unique β for which the auction
and negotiations yield the same revenue.
The seller prefers the English auction over any negotiation if the second buyer
is sufficiently strong. This extends BK’s revenue ranking to asymmetric buyers and
uncovers an important restriction of the validity of BK’s analysis. In the concluding
remarks, BK argue that “a firm that refused to negotiate with a potential buyer, and
instead put itself up for auction, should be presumed to have exercised reasona-
ble business judgment.”. The result of proposition 8.3 substantially weakens this
assertion.
One could object, however, that proposition 8.3 states the obvious. BK’s result is
valid for symmetric buyers and, by continuity, remains valid if the additional buyer
is not too weak. It may be more important to understand how weak the additional
buyer is allowed to be.
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To address this critique, notice first that the explicit solution for ΠN and ΠEA
can be used to check whether the additional buyer is strong enough for any α and
β. Second, β¯(α), which is the lowest β for which (8.5) holds, is strictly lower than
α. This is because (8.5) holds for α = β and, by continuity, also if β is slightly
lower. Third, it is easy to show that ∂∂α β¯(α) < 1. This implies that, as the first buyer
becomes stronger, the additional buyer needs to be relatively less strong.
8.4 Colluding buyers
Buyers may cooperate and form a cartel of buyers, also known as a bidding ring.
The presence of bidding rings has been documented in various industries and, ac-
cording to some observers, bidding rings almost always plague auctions. Even if
firms are ex ante symmetric, the formation of an incomplete bidding ring creates
asymmetries between ring-members and outsiders. This section studies the effect
of a bidding ring on the value of competition.
Suppose the initial n ≥ 1 buyers have formed a bidding ring, of the type descri-
bed in Graham and Marshall (1987). Then, the bidding ring sends the buyer with
the highest value to the negotiations. This implies that the seller faces a buyer who-
se value is drawn from F(u)n. For tractability, assume that individual buyers draw
their value from the uniform distribution on the unit interval. Then, by relabeling
(8.3), the revenue of the optimal mechanism can be written as
ΠN = n(n+ 1)
n+1
n . (8.6)
Instead of inviting one additional buyer, as BK assume, suppose that the seller may
invite k additional buyers and run an absolute English auction. Assume that the
new buyers do not join the ring or collude themselves. (Otherwise, the auction
yields zero revenue to the seller.) To derive the revenue of the English auction,
note that if the cartel’s nominee wins the auction, he expects to pay the maximum
value among the non-colluding buyers. This implies that, for a general common
distribution function F, the expected payment of the nominee when his value is x
is
M(x) =
∫ x
0
udF(u)k. (8.7)
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The ex ante expected payment, i.e. before the nominee learns his value, is simply
E[M] =
∫ v
0
u(1− F(u)n)dF(u)k. (8.8)
Given that the nominee’s value is x, the representative new buyer’s value is yi, and
yi > x, buyer i expects to pay
mi(x, yi) = Pr (x > max{y−i}) x
+Pr (x < max{y−i} < yi) E [max{y−i} < yi]
= F(x)k−1x+
∫ yi
x
udF(u)k−1.
By integrating over x and y one obtains the new buyer’s ex ante expected payment
E[m] =
∫ v
0
(1− F(u))F(u)k−1ud(u)n +
∫ v
0
(1− F(u))F(u)nudF(u)k−1. (8.9)
The revenue of the English auction is simply E[M] + kE[m]. For the uniform distri-
bution, this becomes
ΠEA =
k(n+ k2 + 2kn+ n2 − 1)
(k+ 1)(n+ k)(n+ k+ 1)
. (8.10)
Does the presence of collusion destroy BK’s revenue ranking? To answer this ques-
tion, consider first a bidding ring of two buyers (n = 2). In that case, as is straight-
forward to verify by comparingΠN andΠEA, just one additional buyer is sufficient
to ensure that the auction yields more revenue. So, even if a seller faces an all-
inclusive cartel in negotiations, inviting just one extra buyer and hold an auction
instead more than offsets the loss in bargaining power.
Just as with asymmetric non-cooperative buyers, the English auction generates
more revenue if the number of additional (non-cooperative) buyers is sufficiently
large.
Proposition 8.4. There is a unique number of buyers k such that for every bidding ring
with n buyers the absolute English auction with n+ k members raises more revenue than
any negotiation with the bidding ring.
Proof. For k = 0, the English auction yields zero revenue, and is therefore domina-
ted by negotiations. As k goes to infinity, the revenue of the English auction conver-
ges to 1, which is strictly aboveΠN . Finally, since the revenue of the English auction
with n+ k buyers increases in k, there is a unique k such that ΠN = ΠEA.
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Similar to the case of asymmetric buyers, collusion among buyers does not im-
ply that additional buyers are less valuable than the optimal mechanism. Negotiati-
ons with a small bidding ring are less profitable to the seller than an English auction
with a relatively large group of outsiders. To understand how large the number of
outsiders should be, consider the ratio k¯(n)/n, where k¯(n) is the (unique) solution
of ΠN(k) = ΠEA(k). It is straightforward to show that k¯(1)/1 is 2/3. Moreover,
k¯(n)/n decreases in n. Hence, for any bidding ring, the number of outsiders is at
most 2/3 of the number of cartel members.
Two caveats. When a bidding ring exists, foregoing the ability to negotiate may
be very costly, irrespective of the number of additional buyers. First, the new buy-
ers may collectively join the ring, extracting all surplus from the seller. Second,
switching from negotiations to an auction may actually induce collusion, because,
as Robinson (1985) noted, collusion in an English auction is one-shot stable.
8.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter complements BK’s upper bound on the value of mechanism design
with an upper bound on the value of competition. This new upper bound helps
to explain why in many environments sellers prefer negotiations over auctions. In
particular, a seller who possesses better information about the value of a buyer than
any other buyer is better off by relying on negotiations to maximize revenue.
There are more reasons why a seller may prefer negotiations over auctions.
Large asymmetries between buyers tilts the scale in favor of negotiations, as do
bidding rings. The underlying reason why BK’s revenue ranking of auctions and
negotiations fails in these two cases is the same. In negotiations, the seller is able
to extract (through a take-it-or-leave-it-offer) the buyer’s or ring’s large expected
value. In a simple auction without a reserve price he is unable to exploit his know-
ledge of one buyer’s or ring’s large willingness-to-pay.
In view of the general theme of this thesis, collusion, this chapter’s main in-
sight is that in the presence of a cartel a seller may respond by changing the selling
format. This is more drastic than the policy recommendations in chapters 6 and
7, which concluded that an auctioneer may adapt the auction rules in response to
collusion. The analysis in this chapter advises to abandon the auction altogether in
certain special cases.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
11.
George J. Stigler (1977, p. 442)
9.1 Summary
Many countries, including Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States,
have adopted antitrust (or competition) laws that prohibit firms to enter into agree-
ments that are potentially harmful to society at large. Acts that are considered to
be illegal include horizontal mergers that create a monopoly and price agreements.
Although such laws have been in place for many years (the U.S. Sherman Act da-
tes from 1890) and are uncontroversial among most economists and policymakers,1
there are still many open questions. The essays in this thesis apply game-theoretic
tools to formulate and answer some of these questions.
A central tenet of the Chicago School is that a cartel bears the fruit of its own
destruction, because supra-competitive profits attracts new firms. As this reaso-
ning seems plausible, the open question here is why we still observe cartels. How
long does it take for entry to destabilize a cartel? More generally, which factors
determine the durability of a cartel? Chapter 2 presents a model to address this
issue. It is shown that collusion is viable, even when cartel members face the threat
of entry. The model allows for a closed-form expression of the expected lifetime
of a cartel. Key determinants that affect a cartel’s stability are the number of cartel
members and the cost of deterring entry.
1Robert Bork (1978) is one of the few outspoken critics of antitrust laws. He contends that the American
antitrust policy slows down innovation and protects small businesses instead of consumers.
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One of the main activities of antitrust authorities is to detect and punish collu-
sive behavior. Given the illegal nature of price conspiracies, firms try to keep their
agreements private by negotiating in the proverbial “smoke-filled rooms”. The only
information that may give away the presence of a cartel is therefore public infor-
mation such as prices. A high price might indicate the presence of a cartel, but is
also consistent with a high-cost industry. An antitrust authority has an ex post in-
centive to investigate the former industry but not the latter. Chapter 3 studies this
game between firms and an antitrust authority. The analysis reveals that, when an
antitrust authority is unable to commit, firms will collude with some probability.
The government can decrease the incidence of collusion by instructing the antitrust
authority to maximize consumer welfare instead of social welfare.
Chapter 4 considers semicollusion. When firms engage in semicollusion, they
coordinate on some strategic variables, such as the range of products, prices or ser-
vice provision, but act non-cooperative on others. Even though this form of collu-
sion seems to be ubiquitous, the vast majority of the literature on collusion restricts
attention to full collusion. An important open question is how semicollusion differs
from full collusion. Does competition on the quality dimension wash away the col-
lusive profits obtained by coordination of prices? Are consumers better off under
semicollusion than under full collusion? The analysis in the chapter implies that
semicollusion is still profitable for firms, as compared to non-cooperative behavior,
but the optimal price depends on the firms’ ability to compete through service pro-
vision. In particular, when providing service is relatively costly, the cartel chooses
to set a high price, knowing that firms will be restricted in competing the collusi-
ve profits away. On the other hand, when providing service is relatively easy the
cartel chooses to set a low price, as compared to the non-cooperative price, to mo-
derate the degree of competition through service provision. In general, consumers
prefer non-cooperative behavior over semicollusion, and semicollusion over full
collusion.
Chapter 5 revisits a classic topic of industrial organization: resale price main-
tenance. The classic Chicago position on vertical restraints such as resale price
maintenance is that they are voluntarily agreed to by upstream and downstream
firms, and necessarily enhance efficiency. The prevailing view, however, holds that
resale price maintenance is pro-collusive and should therefore be banned. Chapter
5 studies a simple model of a manufacturer and two downstream retailers. Under
the assumption that the manufacturer and retailers aim to maximize profits, it is
shown that resale price maintenance may have an anti-collusive effect. The reason
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is that by imposing a price floor, the manufacturer makes it impossible for retailers
to form a cartel as a high price floor makes it attractive for retailers to deviate from a
cartel agreement. This suggests another pro-efficiency interpretation of resale price
maintenance.
An important question concerns the interplay between market characteristics
and the scope for collusion. It is well-known that certain properties of markets
may hinder or foster collusion between firms.2 For instance, it is easier to collu-
de for firms when consumers order their goods regularly and frequently. There is,
however, little systematic knowledge on this relation. Chapter 6 fills this gap by
reviewing the existing literature on the ties between collusion and market characte-
ristics for a market that becomes increasingly important: auctions. The bottom line
of this chapter is that auctioneers may prevent collusion by twisting and tweaking
the auction rules. In response to a cartel, an auctioneer has various tools at his dis-
posal, such as adjusting the auction format, imposing a reserve price, or limiting
the bidders discretion in submitting a bid. The task of deterring cartels, therefore,
does not rest solely on the shoulders of antitrust authorities.
The discussion on collusion in auctions continues in chapters 7 and 8. Chapter
7 studies collusion in a multidimensional auction, in which a firm’s bid consists of
a price and a quality index. The analysis consists of two parts. First, the chapter
presents a derivation of the optimal collusive scheme when firms can and cannot
make transfers to each other. This exercise helps to understand how cartels work in
actual multidimensional auctions. Moreover, the analysis is instrumental in the se-
cond part of the chapter, where a number of anti-collusive strategies are discussed.
The main insight is that, in order to lower the costs of collusion, auctioneers should
not merely announce a minimum quality level and a maximum price, but try to
construct a scoring method that ranks price and quality pairs and announce a mi-
nimum score belowwhich bids are not eligible. This method is more efficient in the
sense that it results in the socially optimal quality level and yields the auctioneer a
higher surplus.
Although auctions are a popular method in procurement, an even more fre-
quently used method is to negotiate. This seems puzzling, as auctions are easy
to conduct and tend to deliver the buyer better terms of trade than negotiations.
Chapter 8 analytically compares the two mechanisms, and find that in some cases
negotiations do outperform auctions. Most importantly, a seller is better off nego-
tiating when he is certain that a relatively large bidding ring exists.
2 See Motta (2004), chapter 4 for a discussion of these factors.
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9.2 Avenues for further research
Hopefully, the essays in this thesis provide convincing evidence that collusive be-
havior forms a rich source of interesting research. There are many ways in which
the above models can be extended or modified to yield new insights or applicati-
ons. This section discusses a few.
The first essay offered a theory of entry deterrence and finite cartel duration.
That model is still highly stylized. For instance, entrants are passive bystanders. In
practice, entrants do not wait patiently for the incumbents to fail but actively lobby
the government as well. A promising extension would therefore be to explicitly
model the lobbying process by adding a ‘political economy’ component in which
incumbents, entrants and politicians have a strategic role. Another challenging
question is to formulate an econometric model and estimate the expected duration
of cartels.
The essay on antitrust enforcement, chapter 3, studied a model in which firms
may have two types; low costs or high costs. An obvious extension is to analyze the
‘continuous-type’ version of the model, in which the costs of firms is drawn from
a continuous interval. A related adjustment is to drop the assumption of common
costs and consider the case where firms’ costs are correlated.
Chapter 4 considered semicollusion. The analysis in that chapter simply as-
sumed semicollusive behavior. It would be interesting to understand why firms
adopt this type of collusion instead of full collusion. An answer presumably relies
on imposing costs of observing a firm’s strategic decisions and assuming that those
costs differ across strategic variables. It is arguably easier to observe a competitor’s
price than its level of service.
The analysis in chapter 5 suggests that it is worthwhile to examine the effect
of vertical restraints other than a price floor on the ability to collude. Empirical
research is also welcome. Despite the controversial nature of the topic, and the
existence of a large theoretical literature, there are few empirical studies of the eco-
nomic effects of vertical restraints. An empirical study may also provide insights
about the empirical relevance of the various theoretical explanations of vertical res-
traints, including the one proposed in this thesis.
Chapter 6 reviewed the literature on collusion in auctions. The most urgent
challenges in this field are empirical: how to detect collusion and how to estima-
te the welfare costs of collusion? An answer to these questions can probably only
be given in the context of a case study, where the researcher has access to detailed
(cost) data. An open theoretical issue is to explain the often used practice of orga-
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nizing a knockout after the actual auction. This method is inefficient and does not
seem to maximize a cartel’s revenue.
The most promising approach for new research related to chapters 7 and 8
seems to be empirical. There is little empirical research on multi-dimensional auc-
tions. By estimating bid functions for these auctions, economists can potentially
estimate the welfare gains or losses of alternative auction formats. Explaining the
choice of a mechanism seems to be a highly relevant research topic as well. Insights
from such a study could improve auction theory. Understanding the determinants
of the choice of a mechanismmay also guide public policy. When is it sensible to in-
struct government agencies to use a particular procurement mechanism? Rich and
reliable data are often scarce and an alternative method to study collusive behavior
in auctions are experiments.
Of course, there are many other issues left to be explored in antitrust econo-
mics. For instance, the profession is now starting to integrate insights from the
endogenous growth literature into industrial organization models. In models of
endogenous growth (the seminal reference is probably Aghion and Howitt, 1992),
firms invest in R&D to become the market leader and render the previous market
leader’s product obsolete. An important characteristic of endogenous growth mo-
dels is that firms do not compete ‘on’ the market, but rather ‘for’ the market. Segal
and Whinston (2007) investigate some implications of this form of competition for
antitrust policy. As this literature is still to be developed, there are many interes-
ting open questions. What is, to name just an example, the scope for collusion when
firms are involved in a perpetual R&D race? What is the relevance of merger policy
in such an environment?
There exists a large body of knowledge on political economics. The majority of
articles in that field, however, restricts attention to macroeconomic issues such as
monetary policy, income distribution or economic growth, see for instance the text-
books by Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000). Antitrust policy often has
a significant political dimension. Governments sometimes encourage a merger of
large national firms to create a ‘national champion’. And a supra-national or federal
antitrust authority, such as the European Commission, may encounter strong local
political opposition when it decides to impose a huge fine for price fixing. This
political dimension of antitrust is usually ignored in the literature. An exception
to this claim are papers by Ro¨ller and his co-authors (see Neven and Ro¨ller, 2005
or Ro¨ller and Waverman, 2001). There are many interesting problems in ‘political
industrial organization’. How should we view the interaction between politicians
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and the antitrust authority? In the spirit of the central banking literature, are poli-
tically independent antitrust authorities better capable of deterring collusion than
dependent ones?
9.3 Policy recommendations
Every essay in this chapter is a theoretical exercise. Yet, one can distill several
insights that are relevant for policymakers. Perhaps the most general lesson that
can be drawn is that there aremanyways to combat cartels. Investigating industries
and imposing a fine if a cartel is found is not the only strategy. There are other, more
creative, solutions. This section discusses the policy implications in more detail.
The analysis in chapter 2 suggests that the antitrust authority should take the
expected duration of a cartel into account when deciding to investigate an industry.
The model suggests that industries with a well-organized trade union are more
likely to accommodate a long-lived cartel, as are industries which are protected
from vigorous competition by an import barrier. Investigation is costly, and should
therefore be targeted toward the (potential) cartel with the largest negative impact.
A second implication is that policymakers can attempt to decrease the durability of
cartels. For instance, the government can lower the import tariffs to induce entry
of foreign firms. The strategy of decreasing the durability of cartels can be seen as
an indirect way to combat cartels, as compared to the traditional strategy of fining
cartels.
The lesson of chapter 3 is that policymakers should carefully rethink the objecti-
ves of the antitrust authority. Does the antitrust authority have the right incentives
to effectively deter collusion? Related to this issue is the question of how the anti-
trust authority can be held accountable. In contrast to central banking, where the
performance of the central bank can be measured according to an inflation target,
there is no obvious, measurable, target in antitrust.
The results in chapter 4 warn antitrust authorities not to take quality, service,
or other non-price strategic variables as given when setting a fine for a cartel. As-
suming that non-price strategic variables are unchanged under collusion tends to
yield biased estimates of the welfare costs of collusion.
The immediate policy implication of chapter 5 is that the current European ban
on resale price maintenance should be lifted. The arguments in favor of resale pri-
ce maintenance, which may be summarized under the header of pro-efficiency, are
more compelling than the traditional view that resale price maintenance fosters col-
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lusion. The simple model in this chapter demonstrates that resale price maintenan-
ce may actually be anti-collusive, which undermines the pro-collusive argument
against this vertical restraint.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Leegin to abolish the illegal treatment of
resale price maintenance, and now favors a rule of reason standard.3 This seems
to be an attractive option for the European Union as well. With a rule of reason,
the European Union effectively adopts a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy. When the pro-
collusive view turns out to be correct, the Union can still refuse upstream firms to
use this restraint.
The articles surveyed in chapter 6 clarify the role of the auctioneer in preventing
collusion. By responding to signals for collusive behavior, an auctioneer can adjust
the design of the auction to prevent the emergence of a cartel or at least mitigate
the negative revenue effects. Thus, collusion can be deterred ex ante at the market
design stage, instead of ex post, by prosecuting an existing cartel.
The most important implication of chapter 7 is that an auctioneer in a multidi-
mensional setting should construct a scoring index to rank multidimensional bids
and announce a minimum score below which bids are not eligible. Of course, the
construction of such an index can be a difficult exercise, and in some cases prohibi-
tively costly.
3 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 480 (2007).
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Samenvatting
Kort overzicht
Dit proefschrift gaat over de economische theorie van kartels. Er is sprake van een
kartel wanneer een aantal bedrijven, expliciet of stilzwijgend, afspreekt om de prijs
te verhogen of de kwaliteit te verminderen. In Nederland en veel andere landen is
dit verboden, omdat consumenten door dergelijke afsprakenmeer betalen voor een
inferieur produkt. In ieder hoofdstuk probeer ik e´e´n of meer aspecten van de dy-
namiek van kartels beter te begrijpen door een speltheoretisch model op te stellen.
Aan de hand van zo’n model kunnen vervolgens methoden worden afgeleid die
bijdragen aan het uiteenvallen van kartels of zelfs de vorming ervan voorkomen.
Kartels
Waarom zijn prijsafspraken eigenlijk verboden? Immers, “de concurrent heeft ook
vrouw en kinderen”. Door het onderling afstemmen van de prijs zijn ondernemers
zeker van werk en een goed belegde boterham. Het belangrijkste economische
argument voor het kartelverbod is dat prijsafspraken de consument onevenredig
hard treffen.
Een voorbeeld. Stel dat op een lokale markt voor paarden vier potentie¨le ko-
pers zijn; Arnold, Bas, Corine en Daniel. Elke koper heeft interesse in slechts e´e´n
paard en de bedragen die ze daarmaximaal voorwillen betalen zijn, respectievelijk,
e 10.000, e 8.000, e 5.000 en e 2.000. Op dezelfde markt zijn ook twee paardenfok-
kers actief. De totale kosten voor het leveren van een paard bedragen, inclusief
een redelijke marge voor de aanbieder, e 2.000. In het geval dat de paardenfokkers
geen kartel vormen, zullen de kopers het paard kopen bij de aanbieder met de laag-
ste prijs. Dit zal uiteindelijk leiden tot een prijs van e 2.000. Voor Arnold betekent
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Waardering 
€ 2.000 
A         B         C        D 
(a) Concurrentie  
Waardering 
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(b) Kartel
Figure 1. Consumentensurplus op de paardenmarkt.
dit een surplus vane 8.000,wante 10.000-e 2.000 ise 8.000. Het totale surplus van
de kopers (het consumentensurplus) is e 15.000. Figuur 1a vat de situatie samen.
Het consumentensurplus is weergegeven als het grijze oppervlak. De winst van
de paardenfokkers is precies nul en daarmee is het maatschappelijke surplus (het
surplus van consumenten plus de winst van bedrijven) ook e 15.000.
Stel nu dat de fokkers een prijsafspraak maken. Het is voor hen optimaal om
e 8.000 per paard te vragen. Andere prijzen leveren minder winst op, zoals een-
voudig is na te rekenen. Dewinst van de fokkers wordt dane 12.000, omdat de ver-
koop aan Arnold en Bas tweemaal e 8.000 oplevert minus de kosten van tweemaal
e 2.000. Het consumentensurplus daalt naar e 2.000, zoals is te zien in figuur 1b.
Het lagere consumentensurplus hoeft nog geen rechtvaardiging van overheidsin-
grijpen te zijn. De consumenten zijn weliswaar slechter af, maar de fokkers hebben
een hogere winst. En waarom zou de overheid het belang van de fokkers minder
zwaar laten wegen dan dat van de paardenkopers?
De reden is dat consumenten onevenredig hard getroffen worden door het kar-
tel. Het verlies van de consumenten weegt niet op tegen de hogere winst. Vo´o´r de
oprichting van het kartel was het maatschappelijke surplus e 15.000. Als gevolg
van de hogere prijs daalt het maatschappelijke surplus naar e 14.000. Sommige
consumenten (in dit geval Corine en Daniel) zijn niet meer bereid te kopen en hun
surplus gaat verloren.
Het voorkomen van dit welvaartsverlies is de voornaamste reden om prijsaf-
spraken te bestrijden. Een ander belangrijk argument is dat kartels innovatie en
daarmee de economische groei vertragen. Als bedrijven onderling afspraken ma-
ken hoeven ze niet meer om de gunst van de consument te strijden door nieuwe of
verbeterde produkten aan te bieden.
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Bevindingen
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel bevat een viertal essays
waarin wordt bestudeerd hoe kartels omgaan met verstoringen van hun markt-
macht. Kartels hebben bijvoorbeeld te maken met de dreiging van nieuwe toetre-
ders of toezicht van demededingingsautoriteit. Kortom, in het eerste deel wordt de
invloed onderzocht van dreigingen waar samenspannende bedrijven in de realiteit
ook mee geconfronteerd worden. Het tweede deel van het proefschrift gaat in op
de werking van kartels bij veilingen.
Deel 1
Het ene kartel is het andere niet. Sommige kartels bestaan tientallen jaren, in an-
dere houden bedrijven het niet langer dan twee jaar met elkaar uit. De negatieve
maatschappelijke impact van een kartel is veel groter als het kartel langer bestaat.
Het is daarom van belang om te begrijpen wat de determinanten zijn van de ver-
wachte levensduur van een kartel. In hoofdstuk 2 introduceer ik een model om dit
te analyseren. De essentie van het model is dat karteldeelnemers moeten investe-
ren om toetreding te voorkomen. De verwachte levensduur van een kartel neemt
af als het aantal karteldeelnemers of de investeringskosten toenemen.
Een belangrijke taak van mededingingstoezichthouders is om kartels te voor-
komen. Hiervoor spoort de toezichthouder kartels op en deelt een boete uit als
een overtreding wordt geconstateerd. Gezien de mogelijk hoge boetes is het niet
verwonderlijk dat bedrijven prijsafspraken stil proberen te houden. In het uiterste
geval is het enige waarop een toezichthouder zich kan baseren de hoogte van de
prijzen. Een hoge prijs kan een indicatie zijn dat een kartel actief is, maar kan ook
betekenen dat de kosten hoog liggen. Een toezichthouder zal alleen onderzoek uit
willen voeren als er een kartel bestaat. In hoofdstuk 3 bestudeer ik het spel tus-
sen de toezichthouder en bedrijven. Ik laat zien dat bedrijven altijd met positieve
kans een kartel vormen. De kans dat dit gebeurt kan worden verkleind door de
toezichthouder consumentenwelvaart te laten maximaliseren in plaats van totale
welvaart.
In de bestaande literatuur wordt er normaliter van uitgegaan dat karteldeelne-
mers perfect samenspannen. De praktijk leert dat bedrijven soms prijsafspraken
maken, maar tegelijkertijd met elkaar blijven concurreren door bijvoorbeeld meer
kwaliteit te bieden. De vraag die ik in hoofdstuk 4 stel is in hoeverre een kartel
waarin alleen prijsafspraken maken (een semikartel) verschilt van een kartel waar-
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in ook afspraken over kwaliteit worden gemaakt (een volledig kartel). Hiervoor
maak ik gebruik van een model waarin bedrijven zich van elkaar kunnen onder-
scheiden door een hogere kwaliteit aan te bieden of door toevallig beter te passen
bij de persoonlijke voorkeuren van consument. Consumenten zijn niet alwetend en
zullen erop uit moeten gaan om te zoeken naar een produkt dat goed bij hen past.
Het model kan worden gezien als een wiskundige kijk op de zoektocht van een
shopaholic naar dat ene perfecte paar schoenen. Net als bij een volledig kartel zijn
consumenten slechter af bij een semikartel, hoewel het tweede type minder schade-
lijk is dan de eerste. Een verrassende uitkomst is dat de prijs bij een semikartel lager
kan liggen dan zonder een kartel. Door een lage prijs af te spreken voorkomen de
karteldeelnemers dat ze vervolgens een felle concurrentiestrijd om de consument
beginnen.
In het vierde essay van dit proefschrift, hoofdstuk 5, bestudeer ik een klassiek
onderwerp uit de literatuur: verticale prijsbinding. Dit is een voorwaarde waarbij
een fabrikant of groothandelsonderneming een afnemer verplicht om het produkt
niet onder een door de fabrikant of groothandelsonderneming vastgestelde prijs te
verkopen. Het gebruik van deze voorwaarde stuit vaak op mededingingsrechter-
lijke bezwaren. Het argument dat hiervoor door de toezichthouder wordt gegeven
is dat verticale prijsbinding leidt tot hogere prijzen. In een eenvoudig model laat
ik zien dat verticale prijsbinding juist kan leiden tot lagere prijzen, doordat een
fabrikant minimumprijzen zal gebruiken om een afnemerskartel te voorkomen.
Deel 2
In hoofdstuk 6 bestudeer ik hoe bedrijven prijsafspraken kunnen maken bij aanbe-
stedingen of veilingen. Het belang van veilingen in de economie is enorm en neemt
alleen maar toe. Aanbestedingen zijn helaas vaak zo opgezet dat kartelvorming in
de hand wordt gewerkt. Ondernemingen weten, door ervaring of openbare infor-
matie, meestal goed welke andere ondernemingen meedingen naar de opdracht.
Daarnaast geeft de aanbestedende dienst vaak openheid over maximale toelaatba-
re prijs. Het enige wat kartelleden dan nog moeten doen is afspreken wie intekent
op deze maximale toelaatbare prijs. Mocht een kartellid het niet eens zijn met de-
ze afspraak en hoger bieden dan de uitverkoren winnaar, dan kunnen de overige
kartelleden bij een veiling bij opbod alsnog hoger bieden dan het dwarse kartellid.
Afwijken van de afspraak is dan niet winstgevend.
Aan de hand van bestaande literatuur laat ik zien hoe een veiling aangepast
kan worden om de kans op een kartel te verkleinen of zelfs uit te sluiten. Dit kan
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bijvoorbeeld door een reserveringsprijs in te stellen waarboven niet geboden mag
worden.
De bestaande literatuur over kartels bij veilingen gaat uit van e´e´ndimensionale
competitie: het laagste bodwint. Bij aanbestedingen stelt de opdrachtgevermeestal
ook eisen aan de kwaliteit. Hoofdstuk 7 breidt daarom de analyse uit naar veilin-
gen waarbij het bod een combinatie is van een prijs en een kwaliteitsaanbod. Ik laat
zien hoe de inzichten uit de ‘e´e´ndimensionale’ literatuur vertaald kunnen worden
naar deze situatie. Om de schade van een kartel te beperken kan de opdrachtgever
een reservation utility auction gebruiken. Dit is een veiling waarbij een bod de op-
drachtgever tenminste een minimale prijs-kwaliteit verhouding moet garanderen.
In de praktijk wordt vaak een maximumprijs en een minimumkwaliteit ingesteld.
De reservation utility auction levert de opdrachtgever meer op dan een combinatie
van een maximumprijs en een minimumkwaliteit.
Er bestaan natuurlijk meer methoden dan veilingen om een produkt te kopen
of verkopen. Een veel gebruikte methode is om te onderhandelen. In hoofdstuk 8
vergelijk ik veilingen met onderhandelingen. Het blijkt dat onderhandelingen de
verkoper meer opleveren dan een veiling als de kopers een kartel hebben gevormd.

